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H A W A I ' I EMERGED from its relative obscurity in 20th century world
events to play a prominent role in World War II. The war suddenly
began for Hawaii and the United States when an expansionist, impe-
rial Japan, on December 7, 1941, gambled that a surprise, disabling
attack on Pearl Harbor would guarantee permanent access to needed
strategic resources in the British and Dutch colonies of Southeast
Asia. The first six months of the war were a time of unbroken Japa-
nese military victories, while after May of 1942, Japan saw its thrusts
into the south and central Pacific blunted by the carrier battles of the
Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942). U.S. naval forces
commenced the offensive against Japan in late 1942 in the Solomons
and the Papuan areas of eastern New Guinea. These tentative steps
toward victory were quickened by the successful amphibious offen-
sives in the central Pacific from the Gilbert Islands to Okinawa joined
by the advances across the northern coast of New Guinea into the
Philippines. Ultimately a full scale invasion of Japan was rendered
unnecessary through the deployment of the atomic bombs at Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki in August of 1945. The war in the Pacific offi-
cially ended September 2, 1945.
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As epochal as the attack on Pearl Harbor was, the often overlooked
Honolulu Conference of 1944 played a critical role in determining
the outcome of the successful completion of the Pacific war against
Japan, and provided political cover for one of America's greatest
presidents. Moreover, it played a significant role in convincing ner-
vous American voters that a secretly dying President could complete
an unprecedented fourth term in office. In addition, the conference,
carried out in semi-secrecy, signified Honolulu's strategic role in
America's post-war plans for the Pacific. Though no original tran-
scripts were kept of the meeting, various participants recorded their
memory of the events in subsequent memoirs.
In July of 1944, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was nominated for an
unprecedented fourth term as president of the United States. His
campaign opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, a popular former governor
of New York and moderate Republican, had openly questioned FDR's
health and ability to conduct the government through the dangerous
and uncertain final months of World War II. Other than also ques-
tioning FDR's concessions to the Soviet Union and the ongoing
Republican criticisms of purportedly wasteful deficit of New Deal
spending, Dewey lacked a compelling case for his campaign. Yet with
the national emergency not yet over in Europe or the Pacific, Dewey
argued that Roosevelt's health was a liability that could not be
ignored.
Today, we know that FDR's doctors, closest friends and advisors,
and attending physicians did in fact hide from the public that he was,
by 1944, dying of protracted cardiovascular disease. As the former
Indiana University historian Robert Ferrell discovered in medical
files only released in the late 20th century, FDR had lost vigor, suf-
fered from constant weariness, and had trouble with his handwriting.
His severe related hypertension and hypertensive heart disease, com-
bined with dangerously high blood pressure, led doctors to conclude
he would never finish a fourth term in office.
Partly in order to conceal his alarming condition, FDR decided to
astound those who doubted his vigor by calling suddenly for a con-
ference with General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of
the South-West Pacific area, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, com-
mander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in Honolulu in July of 1944.
In addition, it allowed him to have decisive conferences with Nimitz
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL MACARTHUR 167
and MacArthur over differences that had arisen over the final strategy
for defeating Japan. MacArthur was of particular concern to FDR, as
he had acquired powerful friends among civilian congressional lead-
ers, former state department officials, and Herbert Hoover, the
Republican president from 1929 to 1933. MacArthur, a stern critic of
the New Deal and a popular figure among many Republicans, repre-
sented potential political problems for the president. FDR felt that
a face-to-face meeting with this potential political adversary might
dissuade him from causing trouble during the critical 1944 election.
Finally, FDR hoped that the five-day ocean voyage to Hawai'i from
San Diego would give him needed time to rest away from the glare
of media.
The deuteragonist at the Honolulu Conference was the imperial
Douglas MacArthur. One of America's most political generals, he had
been America's most decorated soldier in World War I. Raised by
ambitious parents to be a great military commander, MacArthur had
worked assiduously to make alliances among powerful Republicans,
the men who made up much of the government from 1921 until
FDR's ascendancy in 1933. Although his career languished in the
1930s, he found his opportunity for greatness restored with the out-
break of World War II.
Yet, in 1942, MacArthur had presided over the biggest defeat in
army history when he was forced to surrender 70,000 American and
Filipino troops on the Bataan peninsula guarding Manila Bay, and
the attendant fortress of Corregidor. Moreover, Japanese planes had
destroyed much of his air force on the ground, despite warnings that
ajapanese attack was imminent, in December of 1941. Forced by mil-
itary orders to flee the Philippines for Australia in the spring of 1942,
he felt that his redemption lay in crossing New Guinea and rescuing
the men he had left behind. Specifically, his honor could be restored
if he could advance across the jungles of New Guinea faster than the
Navy could advance toward Japan through the central Pacific.
MacArthur also disagreed with the navy's general strategy for
defeating Japan. He favored moving up on Japan through the Solo-
mons and Bismarcks by what he called the New Guinea-Mindanao
Axis. He wanted to have the entire fleet and amphibious forces under
his command to liberate the Philippines before advancing on Japan
itself. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, in charge of navy general strategy,
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however, was for a quicker advance in the Pacific, taking key points
in the Gilbert, Marshall, and Caroline Islands on the way through the
Marianas, to Taiwan, and finally to China's coast to establish a base to
attack Japan. The plan that was adopted in May 1943 was a combi-
nation of these two positions, allowing a dual advance with China as
the ultimate strategic launching pad for the final invasion of Japan.
Under this compromise, and by the end of February 1944, the Gilbert
and Marshall Islands had been secured and the Bismarcks Barrier had
been broken. From then on, MacArthur's forces advanced steadily,
taking the Admiralties at the same time that Nimitz' forces drove into
the Marianas, Tinian, and Guam. During the months that followed,
MacArthur continued to lobby for liberating all of the Philippines
and using Luzon as the springboard to Japan.
But by the spring of 1944, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Ernest J. King wanted a faster, more direct route to Japan. The navy
had developed newer, faster carriers that could reach Japan through
the Marianas and Formosa. There they would establish strategic
bombing sights for the B-29 bombers, and the will of Japan to con-
tinue fighting could be challenged through massive bombing mis-
sions. MacArthur was crushed to learn that many in the navy wanted
his famous New Guinea campaign to end in the Southern Philippines.
The recapture of Luzon and the freeing of his captured soldiers
would have to wait until the real war was won through taking the fight
directly to Japan. An indignant MacArthur had long distrusted the
motives of his political enemies in Washington, D.C., and demanded
an audience with FDR to argue his case. The Pentagon, alarmed at his
constant complaints, ordered MacArthur to meet Roosevelt on July
26, 1944, in Honolulu. MacArthur hurriedly packed his bags and
headed for Honolulu knowing that he had political cards to play with
Roosevelt, a man he personally detested for his character and his
policies.
Roosevelt departed for Honolulu from San Diego on the heavy
cruiser Baltimore on July 21. Surrounded by family, he spoke to report-
ers of the need for his re-election in order to conclude the war and
to make a strong peace. He also promised to lay the groundwork for
additional government programs to provide economic and social
stability in post-war America. Privately, Roosevelt seethed that Mac-
Arthur's political dislike for him had become public. Using his politi-
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cal connections with leaders in Congress, MacArthur had implied
that he would allow himself to be drafted by the Republicans to run
for president in 1944. He had, for example, correspondence with
Hoover's former undersecretary of state, William R. Castle, scion of a
prominent New England and Hawai'i family, in which he sharply crit-
icized Roosevelt's friendliness with the Soviet Union and his expen-
sive New Deal programs. When his dalliance with party operatives and
congressional Republicans came to light, Roosevelt was shocked with
the disloyalty in the midst of war. Although he did not comment pub-
licly, the political intrigues of MacArthur ratified Roosevelt's long dis-
like and distrust of a general who would use a political club to lever-
age supplies, attention, and strategic priorities.
Departing San Diego amidst unconfirmed reports of Japanese
naval activity 200 miles north of Honolulu, FDR's cruiser took a zig-
zag route for much of the five-day trip to Honolulu. As the report of
Japanese activity proved incorrect, FDR took advantage of the calm
of the Pacific voyage to lie on deck with officers and sailors. His dog
Fala by his side, he spun stories, snoozed, read through coded mail,
and chatted with the few advisors he had brought along for this
quickly called and unofficial conference.
The Baltimore docked at Pearl Harbor at 3:00 P.M. on July 26. Only
an hour before, MacArthur had arrived after a 26-hour flight from
Brisbane, Australia. Hardly settled at Fort Shafter, home of the Pacific
Command, he was summoned by Roosevelt to his cabin room. Always
one for a symbolic gesture, MacArthur kept FDR and the top Pacific
command waiting on ship as he rounded up a grand open touring
car procured from a well-known Honolulu brothel madam. As FDR,
Nimitz, and other high officials prepared to go below deck, Mac-
Arthur arrived to the cheers of the crowd, waved regally, and strutted
to the top of the gangplank in an open shirt and leather jacket. After
a brief meeting, the two giants had their pictures taken for release
during the campaign season. Agreement was reached on the meeting
times the next day as well as a carefully orchestrated set of photo
opportunities of the two inspecting Hawaii's troops. Then, FDR was
transported, in a humble closed car, to spend the night in Waikiki at
the beach estate of the prominent businessman Chris R. Holmes, a
three-story home with an outside elevator.
Back in his officer's quarters at Fort Shafter, MacArthur raged to
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aides that FDR knew nothing of military matters, was "a fake," and had
come to Honolulu on a junket to fool the American people about his
health. Moreover, he raged that Roosevelt was only intending to use
him for photo opportunities to win votes. He also told aides that the
president was clearly dying and that he ought to admit his real con-
dition to the American people and drop out of the race. Moreover, he
fumed to devoted aides about how his entire career had been a bat-
tle with incompetent bureaucrats for proper resources to do his job.
The next day, Roosevelt chose Honolulu's only other long open
touring car, owned by the Honolulu fire chief, to inspect all of the
nearby military bases with MacArthur (fig. 1). Teams of photogra-
phers caught their every move much to the pleasure of the president.
Such photos would be published widely and would give every impres-
sion of a healthy president who was an active commander in chief.
Interestingly, a few staff officers advised Roosevelt to exclude Nisei
soldiers: that is, soldiers who were sons of Japanese immigrants born
in the U.S., from camera range on the distant possibility that a fanatic
FIG. 1. The Presidential motorcade sweeping up the driveway of St. Louis College in
Kaimukl, as part of the President's tour of military bases. The school was serving as the
army's 147th General Hospital in 1944. DeSoto Brown collection/National Archives,
U.S. Navy.
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might attempt to assassinate him. Roosevelt quickly dismissed such
fears and asked that any Nisei be photographed with him along with
other soldiers.The conference itself did not begin until after dinner
at the Holmes estate. Admiral Nimitz spoke first and argued cogently
for the navy's position of speeding an attack on Japan through For-
mosa. Doing so, he argued, would place the U.S. squarely between
Japan and the Philippines, with the coast of China within range of fast
moving carrier forces. Japan, with American submarines blockading
her shipping and facing daily bombing raids, would need to move its
forces off of Honshu and Hokkaido and take the battle to Formosa.
With barely controlled intensity, MacArthur stood to take his turn
in front of the maps laid out in front of the President. He reviewed
his humiliation at Bataan, his promise to return and its importance
to the morale of the American people, and his frustration in having
to fight the joint chiefs of staff over making the Philippines a high
priority. His plan, which he identified with "American honor," was to
retake Manila.
FIG. 2. Tokyo is the target of Admiral Chester Nimitz's pointer as General Douglas
MacArthur, President Franklin Roosevelt, and Admiral William Leahy look on during
their Waikiki conference. DeSoto Brown collection/National Archives, U.S. Navy.
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Apparently at a strategic stalemate, FDR adjourned the planning
group and spoke to MacArthur alone. Seizing the initiative, Mac-
Arthur used his political trump card. Reminding the president that
this was a reelection year, he argued that abandoning 7,000 starving
POWs and 17 million Filipino Christians would turn public opinion
against him. According to what MacArthur would later tell former
President Hoover, in 1946, Roosevelt was shocked with the general's
blunt threat and abrasive manner. Nonetheless, when the others
rejoined the discussion, Roosevelt announced that he would make no
decision about strategy until the next day and praised both Nimitz
and MacArthur for their grasp of grand strategy.
The next morning, at 10:30 A.M., the group reassembled for fur-
ther discussion. The mood was friendlier, and those present agreed to
work closely together on behalf of the common goal of defeating the
Japanese. MacArthur also firmly restated his position and promised to
hand the Philippines over to Roosevelt within six to nine months with
minimal loses. He repeated his claim that if only the navy had been
prepared for Japan's attack in 1941, he could have reinforced and
properly defended his position in the Philippines. Now he had an
opportunity to make up for the country's embarrassment by retaking
the Philippines.
At about noon, on this final day of the conference, FDR said he
had heard enough, waved his hands, and said he had accepted Mac-
Arthur's proposal and would expect Nimitz to assist MacArthur in
the recapture of Luzon. With no further comment, he dismissed the
group for lunch. Overjoyed at this successful resolution of a nagging
strategic stalemate, MacArthur rushed to catch a waiting plane at
Hickam Field. Before leaving, however, he made one more speech
praising FDR for his sound strategic mind. With that he sped off to
catch his plane while privately telling an aide that FDR would be dead
within a year.
As Roosevelt prepared to leave Honolulu for military inspections
in the Aleutians, he gave a brief press conference in which he praised
MacArthur for his progress in the war with Japan, extolled the state
of training and readiness on Hawai'i's bases, and noted with pleasure
how many changes had come to Honolulu since his vacation in the
city 10 years before. He compared Honolulu to the major sophisti-
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cated cities in the U.S. and predicted a flourishing of its economy
after the war.
Although no official transcripts of this conference exist, MacArthur
would later tell several people that he had used Roosevelt's need to
show progress in the war and an image of good health to strike his
own bargain. Clearly no official decisions were made in Honolulu,
and the debate continued in the Pentagon. The final decision to pro-
vide MacArthur his support came officially in mid-September after
naval intelligence had revealed real Japanese vulnerability at Leyte in
the central Philippines.
For historians, the short Honolulu conference is of interest more
for what it tells us about Roosevelt in his final year of life and of Mac-
Arthur than of the strategic decisions adumbrated in its unofficial
proceedings. Roosevelt, the supreme politician, was able to neutral-
ize possible opposition for Republicans and the conservative press by
placating the politically well-connected general. On the other hand,
MacArthur's unusual political influence and powerful connections in
Washington led him to test, at least indirectly, the constitutional
divide between civilian and military authority. He would later test the
commander in chief's authority in a more alarming and direct way
when he challenged President Harry S. Truman's strategy in the
Korean War in 1951. His success in negotiating his strategic prefer-
ences at the Honolulu conference would be an important precedent
for this later infamous action.
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